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Shofner: Political Reconstruction in Florida

POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA
by J ERRELL H. S HOFNER

U

the 1930s historians accepted as standard
the interpretations of Reconstruction offered by the “Dunning
school.” Professor William A. Dunning and his students at Columbia University had undertaken extensive research in preparing
scholarly monographs on the Reconstruction period in each southern state. But they wrote at a time when most Americans considered Negroes as inferior beings and their studies usually began
with this basic assumption. It usually followed that the Congressional Radicals had been wrong in all they attempted. Helpless
white populations had been subjugated by selfish outsiders who
plundered the states, using ignorant Negro voters to maintain
control. Since it was fundamentally wrong to assume the Negroes
should vote, it had been regrettably necessary that the native
whites employ severe measures including violence to “redeem”
their states from “Radical rule.”
This interpretation has since been revised and many historians
now agree that Republican administrations, faced with overwhelming obstacles, contributed much that was beneficial to the southern states. The argument is that Radical Republicans brought
improved constitutions, tax-supported education, and recognition
of government responsibility for certain limited welfare services
to the South, but all at an exorbitant cost. It further implies that
Republicans formulated policy without interference from the
native white population whose only alternative was total, violent
resistance. This generalization still imposes a universally applicable
interpretation on an era during which conditions seem to have
varied considerably from state to state. Whatever conditions may
have been in other states, the Reconstruction of Florida does not
fit very accurately into these interpretations. While events in one
small, frontier state may have limited significance for the Reconstruction era in general, they seem worth considering if only in
contrast to the accepted generalization.
Reconstruction in Florida was radical from the point of view
that great changes were attempted in the state’s political, economic,
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and social arrangements. Yet Republican policy was not formulated between 1868 and 1876 by men who were sympathetic
with such Congressional Radicals as Thaddeus Stevens and Charles
Sumner. That group lost out to their moderate colleagues in the
1868 constitutional struggle. Those who formulated party policy
in Florida were business-oriented men who recognized that the
state needed to be developed if the problems created by the Civil
War were to be permanently solved. These men were interested in
Negro rights because the vast majority of their voting supporters
were Negroes and because solving the problems created by emancipation was a necessary preliminary to stable political and social
conditions. Without this stability, development of the state’s
economic resources could not succeed. This kind of Republican
wished to establish the Negro in Florida society without alienating
powerful native leaders whose support was considered essential.
Reconciliation of these conflicting aims almost shattered the
Florida Republican party in its infancy.
Because of major concessions to them by the moderate
Republicans during the 1868 constitutional maneuvers and the
subsequent Republican factionalism, native Democrats influenced
governmental policy during the Reconstruction era far more than
they would admit after they had regained control of the state in
1876. One of their major campaign weapons became the charge
of Republican extravagance and corruption, although the Democratic minority contributed to the situation which made these
charges possible. Democratic citizens benefited along with Republicans from the generous grants of state aid to internal improvement corporations. 1 For years after the Republicans ceased to
command majorities, the threat of a return to ‘‘Radical Reconstruction” was sufficient to overcome major differences of interest between white groups in Florida. The willingness of white Floridians to accept almost any alternative to this threat was incongruous
because their own leaders had exercised a voice during Reconstruction. There was amazingly little immediate policy change
between the Republican administration of Marcellus L. Stearns
and the “redeemer” administration of George F. Drew.
The first and probably most important struggle for control
1. Native Floridians who opposed the Republicans called themselves
variously Conservatives, Conservative-Democrats. They are referred
to in this paper as Democrats.
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between Radical Republican and Republican moderates came during the 1868 constitutional convention and subsequent election.
When it became clear that President Johnson’s Reconstruction
policy would be replaced by the Radical program, several individuals began organizing potential voters in Florida. Thomas W.
Osborn, a Freedmen’s Bureau official, established the Lincoln
Brotherhood with a large Negro membership, but his position was
soon usurped by a group ostensibly sent into the state by the
Republican National Committee. Daniel Richards, a white Radical
from Illinois, William U. Saunders, a Negro barber from Maryland, and Liberty Billings, a New Hampshire minister who had
been a chaplain in a colored Union regiment, had organized the
Union League by late 1867, which commanded broad Negro
support. Another organization was the Jacksonville Republican
Club largely composed of local businessmen. Some, like future
Governor Ossian B. Hart, were Southern Unionists; others, including future Governor Harrison B. Reed, were recently arrived
federal officials. The Jacksonville Republican Club considered a
startling resolution by J. C. Greeley but failed to take any action.
The club member’s plan was to draft a platform upon which
certain Democrats would be willing to unite with them in carrying out Congressional Reconstruction. 2
During the registration of voters and election of convention
delegates in 1867, these groups contended for Republican leadership. Failure to reconcile Southern Unionists and Radicals led to a
realignment and Osborn lost most of his Negro support. With his
remaining followers, he soon joined the moderate Jacksonville
Republican Club. One Massachusetts-born Floridian, with eleven
years residence in the state, complained that Radical insistence on
a no-compromise policy regarding Negro suffrage and civil rights
had split the Republican party and encouraged the opposition to
enter the race for convention seats. 3 This mattered little in the
2. George R. Bentley, “The Political Activity of the Freedmen’s Bureau
in Florida,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXVIII (July 1949), 29;
New York Tribune, February 5, 1868; Daniel Richards to Elihu B.
Washburne, November 11, 1867, Elihu B. Washburne Papers,
Library of Congress; “Proceedings of the Union Republican Club of
Jacksonville,” May 16, 1867, mss. in P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History, Gainesville, Florida; David H. Overy, Jr., Wisconsin Carpetbaggers in Dixie (Madison, 1961), 30.
3. C. D. Lincoln to William Pitt Fessenden, September 20, 1867, William P. Fessenden Papers, Library of Congress.
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election. With 15,441 Negroes and 11,151 whites voting, fortythree Republicans and three Democrats were elected to the convention. About eighteen of these were Negroes.
The Radicals dominated the convention organization which
assembled in Tallahassee on January 20, 1868. The forces of
Richards, Billings, and Saunders were strengthened by Jonathan
C. Gibbs, a well-educated and able Northern Negro; “Bishop”
Charles H. Pearce, a Negro minister just arrived from Canada;
Eldridge L. Ware, a white Key West citizen; and J. H. Goss, a
white Ocala lawyer. They made a determined effort to write a
constitution guaranteeing full citizenship to the Negroes. To prevent Billings and Richards from controlling the new state government, Osborn, whose convention spokesman was Freedmen’s
Bureau official William J. Purman, allied with the Jacksonville
Republicans against the Radicals. Purman and a few delegates used
dilatory tactics to delay the Radical leaders until they could build
up voting strength. Outside the convention, Harrison Reed and
William H. Gleason, both from Wisconsin, were lobbying for
support for the “moderate” Republican faction. Richards and his
allies complained that these “minions of the devil and A. Johnson”
had received money from outside the state while their own funds
had been cut off. 4
A crucial vote on January 31 showed that Billings and Richards still controlled a small majority in the convention. 5 During
the following weekend, nineteen Osborn delegates left the convention and convened their own rump session in nearby Monticello. They were joined there by two Democratic delegates, John
L. Campbell of the second district and W. Rogers of the fifteenth,
who had not yet claimed their convention seats. With advice from
such prominent Florida Democrats as Charles E. Dyke, editor
of the Tallahassee Floridian, and McQueen McIntosh, former
federal judge and ex-Confederate, the “seceders” drafted a con-
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stitution which they hoped would be acceptable to the Democratic
state leadership. 6
With their opponents absent, Billings and Richards ruled
that their twenty-two delegates comprised a quorum and promptly
adopted a constitution embodying the Radical program. A copy
was dispatched to General George G. Meade at Third Military
District headquarters in Atlanta, and the convention adjourned
to await his instructions. At a public meeting, Billings and Saunders were nominated for governor and lieutenant governor. Then,
on February 10, around midnight, the Osborn group quietly
returned from Monticello, moved into the convention hall, and
despite the late hour, reorganized the convention. With the two
Democrats and two Negro delegates, whose support was secured
when C. M. Hamilton, acting as a Freedmen’s Bureau agent,
ordered them to the convention, the moderates now commanded
a narrow majority. 7
Billings and Richards were blocked from entering the hall, and
they were prevented from taking it by force by the federal troops
stationed there at the request of Democratic Governor David S.
Walker over Richard’s vehement protests. 8 Colonel John T. Sprague,
military commander in Florida, had been closely acquainted
with prominent Floridians since his participation in the Seminole
Wars, and he willingly complied with the governor’s request.
The resulting confusion mystified General Meade and he
informed Colonel Flint at Tallahassee: “Richards telegraphs he
has been dispossessed of the hall . . . by a mob, and that the
military is protecting the mob. I presume there is some error . . . .
You will see that order is preserved.” 9 Restoring order, Colonel
Sprague presided temporarily over still another reorganization of
the convention. The moderates were in control and they approved
their own version of the constitution, dispatching a copy to Meade.
Jacksonville Florida Union, March 7, 1868, quoting Pensacola Observer; Edward C. Williamson (ed.), “Florida’s First Reconstruction Legislature: A Letter of William H. Gleason,” Florida Historical
Quarterly, XXXII (July 1953), 41-43.
St. Augustine Examiner, February 22, 1868; U. S. House Miscellaneous Documents, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 109, p. 2-3.
New York Tribune, February 17, 1868; Pensacola West Florida Commercial, February 18, 1868.
George G. Meade to F. F. Flint, February 16, 1868, Letters Received
(1868), Department of the South, Record Group 98, U. S. Army
Command, National Archives.
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The General submitted both drafts to the Congressional Committee on Reconstruction, but recommended approval of the
moderate document since it had majority approval of the convention. In the interim, the moderates nominated Harrison B. Reed
for governor and William H. Gleason for lieutenant governor.
The congressional committee accepted Meade’s recommendation
and authorized an election for ratification and selection of officers
for the new government.
The two draft constitutions differed in only three important
matters; in each, the Monticello version reflected the moderate
Republican effort to appease Democratic leaders. 10 The BillingsRichards draft made most state and county offices elective; the
Monticello document provided more offices and made them appointive by the governor. The latter provision would enable the
governor to control the number of Negro officials in the black
belt counties. The Radical draft required a lengthy loyalty oath
which excluded from office everyone who had supported the
Confederacy; the Monticello version omitted any reference to the
rebellion and required a simple oath of loyalty for officeholders.
The most significant difference between the two drafts pertained
to apportionment of legislative representation. The Radical draft
provided representation in proportion to population which would
have benefited the large, predominantly Negro counties in the
north-central part of the state. Leon County would have had
seven representatives, while Orange, Volusia, Brevard, and Dade
would have shared one. The Monticello document modified equal
representation and guaranteed each county one representative and
no county more than four. By this method, approximately onethird of the voters would elect a majority of the representatives.
The favored counties were predominantly white, virtually assuring
white control of the assembly. 11
The campaign for ratification revealed great differences of
opinion in both parties regarding the proposed constitution. Both
had members who were willing to accept the constitution and
other unalterably opposed to it. Eventually there emerged three
10. John Wallace, Carpetbag Rule in Florida (Jacksonville, 1888), 35094, See also the facsimile edition with introduction by Allan Nevins
(Gainesville, 1964).
11. Washington Weekly Chronicle, March 28, 1868; Richard E. Bain,
“Legislative Representation in Florida: Historic and Contemporary”
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Florida State University, 1960), 93-94.
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slates of candidates for state offices. New York Tribune reporter
Solon Robinson protested that the Negro voters had been sold
out by the convention. Proof of this, he said, was nomination of a
“conservative” like Harrison Reed for governor. 12 The Radicals
kept their state ticket in the field and urged voters to repudiate
the constitution. Evidently Richards hoped to force appointment
of a governor with federal military support.
Numerous Democratic newspapers favored ratification and
election of Reed, and others expressed satisfaction with the
moderate Republican effort to attract Democratic support for the
new government. 13 William Kirk, patronage-hungry editor of the
Pensacola Observer, declared that the constitution had been
adopted with support from Governor Walker and other state
leaders and that “Radicalism has been sent howling from our
midst.” 14 Democratic leaders were divided. Some refused to condone any compromise with Republicans regardless of proffered
concessions, and a few thought opposition was hopeless and did
nothing. Still other influential persons believed they had achieved
a favorable constitution. Edward M. L’Engle declared, “The
proposed constitution will if adopted not absolutely ruin us.” 15
With Republicans feuding and running two slates of candidates, some Democrats decided to run a state ticket of their own.
Charles Dyke of Tallahassee protested that this was a short sighted
policy. He reminded them that he had worked long and hard to
bring about the Republican split, “abusing the one side and patting
the other on the back.” Now those Democrats who desired the
whole loaf or none might force Florida Republicans to coalesce
once more. His own plan was to eschew the gubernatorial and
ratification issue and exploit the generous apportionment provision by concentrating on election of Democratic legislators. 16
12. New York Tribune, February 12, 1868.
13. Pensacola West Florida Commercial, March 10, 1868; Jacksonville
Florida Union, March 7, 1868, quoting Jacksonville Mercury, and
Jacksonville Florida Union, March 21, 1868, quoting Pensacola West
Florida Commerical and Quincy Commonwealth; St. Augustine Examiner, March 21, 1868.
14. Jacksonville Florida Union, March 7, 1868, quoting Pensacola Observer; William Kirk to Edward McPherson, February 5, March 28,
1868, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress.
15. Letter of Edward M. L’Engle, March 5, 1868, E. M. L’Engle Papers,
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina. Microfilm copies in P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.
16. C. E. Dyke to Edward M. L’Engle, March 23, 1868, ibid.
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Dyke reluctantly supported the Democratic ticket which was entered against his advice.
After a bitter campaign and an election in which irregularity
abounded, the constitution was ratified by a vote of 14,520 to
9,491. Moderate candidate Harrison Reed was elected governor
with 14,170 votes to 7,852 for the Democratic candidate and
2,262 for the Radical. By a combination of extra-legal maneuvers
and generous concessions, the moderate Republicans had gained
control of the new government. In doing so they gave Florida a
constitution which satisfied Congressional Radicals but at the same
time gave the ex-Confederates an active place in state affairs. These
moderates preferred to collaborate with native state leaders who
were their economic allies rather than with their own Radical
political associates. Once the Radicals were defeated, the Negroes
would be left without leadership and could be won over later.
Even such Radicals as William U. Saunders and Jonathan C.
Gibbs deserted Billings and Richards to support Reed and the
constitution in the election campaign.
If no permanent coalition of moderate Republicans and Democrats resulted, at least some members of both parties had worked
together and continued to do so afterwards whenever it was
mutually beneficial. The support of two Democratic delegates in
the closely divided constitutional convention had been crucial.
Governor Walker’s efforts in keeping the Radicals from recapturing the convention hall had helped give a legal appearance to the
moderates inside that bastion. General Meade, primarily concerned with peace and order, was impressed by the good relations
between Osborn’s group and some of the local leaders. A huge
asset was Democratic willingness to limit campaign activities to
vocal and editorial criticism. They preferred this constitution to
another which might be drafted if the constitutional convention
was forced to reconvene.
The most important Democratic gain was the apportionment
provision. With the party still disorganized and many white voters
not yet participating in politics, the first legislature had eight
Democrats to sixteen Republicans in the senate and fifteen
Democrats to thirty-seven Republicans in the assembly. Two years
later, in 1870, the Democrats narrowly missed controlling both
houses. With the Republicans usually divided, the large Democratic minority was a power with which to reckon. Governor Reed
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tried to keep the support of Democrats by appointing several of
them to state and county offices. Robert H. Gamble was Reed’s
comptroller and James D. Westcott, Jr., was attorney-general first
and then state supreme court justice. Thomas T. Long, William
A. Cocke, and Pleasant W. White-all Democrats-became
circuit judges. Perhaps some Democratic officials accepted their
office, as one Madison County judge said, to keep it from a
“miserable scalliwag [sic] carpetbag Radical,” but most realized
that these offices gave them a far more effective voice than mere
defiance. 17
The Reed administration was responsible for implementing
the new constitution in a state whose free population had been
nearly doubled by addition of the emancipated Negroes, a social
change bitterly resented by many native citizens. The treasury
was empty and the state had poor credit. Florida’s repudiation of
more than two million dollars in state bonds in the 1840s had
never been settled. Because the Walker administration left a half
million dollar debt, the economy was not strong enough to command respect for new bond issues. It was necessary to borrow
money for operating expenses before a new tax system could be
implemented. Bankruptcy, poor state credit, and increased government commitments under the new constitution, along with inexperienced administrators, were the major reasons for an increasing
state debt during Reed’s administration. 18 One Republican journal
explained that its party spent money on education and replaced
the “whipping post and pillory” with courts of law and a penitentiary thus rendering meaningless any comparison of expenditures
with prior administrations. 19
The problems facing Governor Reed would have been difficult
enough even with the support and cooperation of the major
interest groups. But Reed not only had political enemies who tried
to block his legislative program, but he was forced to spend much
of his time fighting off efforts to remove him from office. The
extra-legal power play by which his faction had vanquished the
17. E. J. Vann to D. H. Hamilton, January 19, 1869, Ruffin-RoulhacHamilton Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North
Carolina.
18. Florida Assembly Journal (1868), 76; Edward Haslewood to W. H.
Gleason, November 17, 1870, William Henry Gleason Papers, P. K.
Yonge Library of Florida History; William A. Scott, Repudiation of
State Debts (New York, 1893), 54.
19. Tallahassee Sentinel, January 8, 1876.
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opposition set an example which plagued the Republican party
and Florida for years. At the same time, Reed’s attempts to achieve
broad support by making concessions to the Democrats alienated
many fellow Republicans. Radical leaders like Richards and Billings were reduced to impotence, but their followers sought new
alignments. Opposition to Reed soon centered around Thomas W.
Osborn who was elected to the United States Senate by the first
Republican-dominated legislature. The Radical versus moderate
division became less important as the party divided between
Osborn and those depending on federal patronage on the one side
and Governor Reed on the other. The governor’s position was
complicated because many Osborn supporters headed county
organizations and held state senate seats.
Nor did all the Democrats support Reed. Former Governor
Walker opposed him personally and did whatever he could to
marshal Democratic opposition. Charles Dyke of the Floridian
was bitterly critical and his columns were always open to dissident
Republicans wishing to attack the administration. But the Democrats were not unanimously opposed to Reed; they were opposed to
the Republican party. Some supported Reed as the lesser of the
evils. 20 During hisadministration the Democratic party did not
always act as a “loyal opposition” willing to criticize administrative policy within the existing frame of government. The constitution guaranteed full citizenship to all persons, but most Florida
Democrats wished to oust Republicans from power, exclude
Negroes from political participation, and restore a white governoring elite. Many were willing to rely on parliamentary and editorial
tactics to discredit the Republicans, but others applied violence,
including murder, to drive the “party of the Negro” from the
state. 21
One of the least defensible acts of those Democrats who later
20. George P. Raney to Edward M. L’Engle, February 8, 1872, L’Engle
Papers.
21. U. S. House Report, No. 22, Part 13, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess.; William
Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida (New
York, 1913) 566, passim, see also the facsimile edition with introduction by Fletcher M. Green (Gainesville, 1964); J. Randall Stanley, History of Jackson County (Marianna, 1950), 201-02; E. M.
Cheney to Ulysses S. Grant, with affidavit, November 18, 1871,
Papers of Attorney General, Records of Department of Justice, Record
Group 60, National Archives (henceforth cited as Justice Dept. Records); Daniel Gillis letter, December 10, 1871, Robert Bigelow
Burton Papers, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.
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claimed to have “redeemed” the state from a corrupt, Negrodominated Republican party was the methods used to win control
in counties such as Columbia and Jackson where the population
was large and almost evenly divided between the races. About
150 persons were killed in Jackson County, most of whom were
Negroes and white Republicans. John Q. Dickinson, the last white
Republican in the county, was gunned down on the main street
of Marianna in April 1871, without a single witness to the
shooting. 22 Violence in the county subsided in late 1871, but only
after President Grant threatened to use military force. By that
time Governor Reed had agreed to appoint local officials recommended by native white leaders. 23
Reed exhausted skill, energy, and time fighting the attempts
to impeach him. In 1868 he angered many Republican legislators
by vetoing an unauthorized mileage appropriation they had voted
themselves. A mild public accommodations bill, which he declared
unnecessary, was also vetoed. 24 Hastily drafted and poorly supported impeachment charges were brought against him, setting a
precedent which would be followed three more times. The governor managed to outwit the impeachers and served out his full term.
His support in these incidents changed from time to time. Negro
legislators and Democrats voted both for and against him on
occasion.
Evidence behind the impeachment charges was usually absent
or inconclusive, but on the third attempt in 1870, a damaging
letter was produced indicating that Reed had accepted a bribe from
George W. Swepson, a North Carolina railroad developer. 25 But
even on this occasion, Reed's defenders maintained that Senator
Osborn had blackmailed Swepson into writing the letter. The
last impeachment attempt in 1872 came nearest to success. Reed
was removed from office and Lieutenant Governor Samuel T. Day
replaced him, but the Senate voted ten to seven against convic22. Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, May 2, 1871; Ralph L. Peek, “Lawlessness in Florida, 1868-1871,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXX
(October 1961), 182.
23. Florida Assembly Journal (1872), 21-22; Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, June 6, 27, 1871.
24. Florida Senate Journal (Extra Session, 1868), 23.
25. George W. Swepson to Harrison Reed, May 31, 1869, quoted in
Wallace, Carpetbag Rule in Florida, 119; State v. Milton S. Littlefield, cases 30 and 31, fall term, 1870, Circuit Court Records, Leon
County, Florida.
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tion, and Reed was restored. Because Democrat William D.
Bloxham was then successfully challenging Day in the courts for
the office which had been fraudulently awarded to him, it has
sometimes been concluded that the Republicans closed ranks and
supported Reed to prevent a Democrat from becoming governor. 26
There was no such party unanimity. Six Democrats joined four
Republicans for acquittal, while three Democrats and four Republicans opposed. 27
In time Reed was criticized for complicity in the “SwepsonLittlefield bond fraud.” The Republicans were condemned for
giving away millions of acres of the public domain, while later
Democratic Governor Bloxham was hailed as a state hero when he
sold 4,000,000 acres of public land for twenty-five cents per
acre. Reed and Bloxham were both acting according to the generally accepted economic policies of their day. To prosper, the
state had to grow, and it could grow only if it became a desirable
place to live. The state should use its abundant public lands to
encourage railroad and canal development and open up unsettled
areas, thus attracting capital investment and new citizens.
Both parties voted for state-supported internal improvement
projects, and members of both parties participated in this kind
of economic activity. Many Democrats were connected with railroad schemes as directors, managers, legal counsellors, bondholders, and receivers. They competed and collaborated with
Republicans in the legislature and courts, as well as the bond
markets and business offices. 23
The largest state-supported enterprise was the Jacksonville,
Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company, incorporated in 18691870 by George W. Swepson of North Carolina, General Milton
S. Littlefield of Maine, and John P. Sanderson, a Florida railroad
man who had supported the Confederacy. Swepson and Littlefield,
it turned out, were unscrupulous manipulators who had already

26. Hilary A. Herbert, et al, Why the Solid South? (Baltimore, 1890),
159.
27. Florida Senate Journal (1872), 68.
28. Prominent among them were John P. Sanderson, Mariano D. Papy,
F. B. Papy, A. J. Peeler, J. M. Peeler, Edward M. L’Engle, D. P.
Holland, Edward Houstoun, Franklin Dibble, Wilkinson Call, Silas
L. Niblack, A. B. Hawkins, David Levy Yulee, John G. McGehee,
and T. W. Brevard.
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swindled a North Carolina railroad. 29 They were guilty of unethical practices, and their railroad failed because of wasteful
financing and poor management. Their methods were patterned
after generally accepted railroad financing in post-Civil War
America. They failed and their activities became known as the
“notorious Swepson-Littlefield fraud,” but if they had succeeded
they would have been hailed as great developers of the state. In
1876 a bitter Republican editor, exasperated at Democratic
charges against his party, claimed that both Governor Reed and
General Littlefield were poor men, while the big houses and fortunes of the Democrats spoke for themselves. 30
The legislation authorizing state-support for the Jacksonville,
Pensacola and Mobile Railroad resulted in the issue of $4,000,000
in state bonds. The disposition of these securities raised the most
volatile political issue of the Reconstruction era in Florida, but
at the time all interests favored the venture. Edward Houstoun,
a Florida railroad builder, publicly endorsed Swepson, and John
Sanderson became a company vice-president. The Tallahassee
Floridian approved the essential east-west road and the company’s
incorporators, and congratulated Littlefield for his efforts in promoting the state. 31
Unfortunately, this unanimity did not last. After Reed’s
abortive impeachment in 1870, when he was charged with accepting a bribe, and many legislators were similarly charged, opposition to the bond issue rapidly developed. Former United States
Senator David L. Yulee, a Democratic railroad man, called the
bonds unconstitutional, and the Democratic New York World
claimed that Floridians would not support taxes for redeeming
these bonds. 32 When their sale in the United States was made impossible, they were heavily discounted to foreign investors. Most
of the proceeds were used to pay lobbyists, lawyers, and brokers,
although about twenty miles of track was built. In 1876 the
29.

32.

Florida Acts and Resolutions (1869), 29; C. K. Brown, “Florida Investments of George W. Swepson,” North Carolina Historical Review,
V (July 1928), 279-80; Paul E. Fenlon, “Notorious Swepson-Littlefield Fraud: Railroad Financing in Florida, 1868-1871,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, XXXII (April 1954), 245-46.
Fernandina Observer, January 1, 1876.
Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, February 1, 1870; Fenlon, “SwepsonLittlefield Fraud,” 248.
David L. Yulee to C. E. Dyke, July 15, 1870, David Levy Yulee
Papers, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.
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Florida Supreme Court, with a Republican majority, declared the
bond issue unconstitutional, and the state took over the road until
it could be sold on behalf of the innocent investors. 33
A perplexing problem resulted from a court injunction prohibiting the sale of public land by the trustees of the Florida
Internal Improvement Fund. Francis Vose, a northern iron
manufacturer, had furnished rails for the Florida Central Railroad
built by Senator Yulee in the 1850s, and held a large amount of
the road’s bonds as payment for the iron. After the war, the Internal Improvement Fund trustees took over the road and sold it,
using the proceeds to redeem the bonds at a fraction of face value.
Vose refused to accept less than the full amount. These bonds
were backed by state lands which in the late 1860s were being
sold or granted to internal improvement enterprises at a rapid rate.
Vose sued to prevent further sale of this security until his claim was
satisfied, and the circuit court issued an injunction against further
disposition of land except by cash sale, the proceeds from which
had to be applied against Vose’s lien.
Everyone agreed that a large cash sale was needed to free
state lands of any encumbrance. Williams, Swann, and Corley,
a Fernandina land company with bipartisan membership, was
commissioned to sell enough land to pay the judgment. A buyer
was found who offered thirty cents per acre for 1,000,000 acres
if Vose would accept this as full payment. Vose refused, and no
large sale was made until 1881, when Governor Bloxham sold
4,000,000 acres to Hamilton Disston of Philadelphia for twentyfive cents an acre. 34 While this encumbrance probably retarded
development during the 1870s, it was not a problem created by
Republican government. It resulted from railroad ventures which
failed because of the Civil War. Members of both parties were
economically affected by Vose case, and efforts to resolve it
were bipartisan.
Despite the economic obstacles and political struggles which
continued within and between the parties, Florida’s economic
situation improved during its second Republican administration.
33. 15 Florida Reports 533 (1876); George P. Raney to Edward M.
L’Engle, January 21, 23, 1876, L’Engle Papers; Tallahassee Weekly
Floridan, December 21, 1875.
34. W. H. Gleason to Trustees of the Florida Internal Improvement Fund,
n.d., Gleason Papers, box 4, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History;
Jacksonville New South, March 6, June 2, 1875.
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In the midst of a major national depression, Florida’s population
was increasing as people took up lands offered by the government,
as well as private land companies. Members of both parties advertised the wonders of Florida and insisted that peace and order
prevailed. Immigration gained momentum during the 1870s under
both Republicans and Democrats. 35
Tax rates were high in comparison with earlier administrations,
and factional strife convinced many Floridians that their taxes
were being squandered by selfish politicians in their struggle for
position. Despite opinions to the contrary, state finances improved after 1873, although it would be some time before this
became noticeable. Careless record keeping, complex bond transactions, and inefficient tax collection created confusion. A special
legislative session in 1873 enacted a funding bill providing for
issue of $1,000,000 worth of thirty-year gold bonds at six percent.
A four-mill property tax was levied for their interest and ultimate
retirement. Most of this issue was sold or exchanged for old
bonds which brought some order to state finances. 36
Reed’s administration had inherited a debt of more than
$500,000, and by 1873, state liabilities were estimated at
$1,900,000. When the second Republican administration ended
in 1877, the debt was about $1,580,000. The $4,000,000 in
railroad bonds was not included because it never obligated the
tax system and was invalidated by the state supreme court in
1876. Yet, according to the Tallahassee Floridian, by 1870, Reed
had increased the debt from $523,856.95 to $14,999,544.41. 37
For years after Reconstruction, Democrats campaigned against
Florida’s Republican administrations of the 1870s. One charge
was the Republicans had almost destroyed the state’s credit before
Democrats assumed office. Yet, state bonds were negotiated during
the period for eighty percent of face value, and state scrip,
New York Florida New Yorker, December 1875; Samuel A. Swann
to J. M. Wing and Co., March 5, 1875, Samuel Ashe Swann Papers,
Letterbook 6, 309, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History; George J.
Alden, Florida: Information For Those Who Desire To Know of the
State, Its Climate, Resources, etc. (Jacksonville, 1875), 7; L. D. Huston to Menifee Huston, March 17, 1874, L. D. Huston Letters, Box 7,
P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History; Palatka Eastern Herald, April
13, 1874; Jacksonville New South, January 27, 1875; Fernandina
Observer, January 5, 1876.
36. Florida Senate Journal (1877), Appendix, Report of the Comptroller,
January 1, 1877, 5.
37. Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, September 20, 1870.

35.
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which was acceptable for tax payments, was selling for eighty
cents in many cases and ninety-five on occasion. Even United
States currency was not circulating at par during this period.
County scrip, in demand for county tax payments, sold for as
much as eighty cents, although some purchases were made for
less. 38
There were major changes in political methods after 1873.
Democrats utilized violence much less as a political weapon than
in the past. Partly, this was because of better enforcement of
federal election laws. Democrats were also finding that they could
achieve their purposes through more acceptable legislative and
campaign tactics. But if violence did not cease altogether in 1873,
it was not abandoned entirely in 1876 either. Democratic violence
did not abate because of any willingness to accept the social
changes brought about by the Civil War and Reconstruction, but
because party members and conservative Republicans had largely
mitigated the effect of these changes. Continued division in the
Republican party enabled Democrats to effectively influence
legislative policy.
The 1872 election showed that the degree of Republican
cohesion was the key to control of Florida politics. Apparently
the Democrats believed they had eliminated enough Negro voters
to assure victory without any concessions to dissatisfied Republicans. When the Democrats met in their Jacksonville convention,
a loosely organized Liberal Republican convention met on the
same day, apparently hoping for an alliance. The Democrats
completely ignored them and nominated a ticket which, according
to Senator Osborn, was “straight out radical rebel.” 39 Bloxham,
who had run successfully for lieutenant governor in 1870, headed
this ticket. The Liberal Republican movement collapsed, and most
of its participants returned to the regular party, which nominated
Ossian B. Hart, a native of Jacksonville, for governor. Marcellus
L. Stearns, Republican boss of Gadsden County and a former
Pennsylvanian, was selected for lieutenant governor. These men
38. Edwin W. L’Engle to Edward M. L’Engle, November 23, 1875, and
H e n r y S . E l l i o t t t o E d w a r d M . L ’E n g l e , N o v e m b e r 2 5 , 1 8 7 5 ,
L’Engle Papers; Samuel A. Swann to J. C. Greeley, June 2, 1875,
VII, 7, and Swann to David L. Yulee, January 30, 1877, Letterbook
13, 114, Swann Papers.
39. T. W. Osborn to W. E. Chandler, August 22, 1872, William Eaton
Chandler Papers, Library of Congress. Microfilm copies in P. K.
Yonge Library of Florida History.
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represented the strongest party factions, and it was hoped that
Hart, an ex-slaveholder and native Floridian, would appeal to
Southern Unionists who were strongly attracted to Bloxham. The
convention tried to appease Governor Reed by resolving to elect
him to the Senate in 1873, but apparently he was not sufficiently
impressed. When he did not come out strongly for the ticket,
several partisans asked the national committee to make concessions to him. 40 In response, National Secretary William E.
Chandler contacted Reed who promptly demanded that his longtime enemies, United States District Attorney Horatio Bisbee, and
United States Marshal Sherman Conant be removed and replaced
with his own followers. Chandler complied and immediately was
overwhelmed with protests from the persons who had encouraged
him to appease Reed in the first place. 41 Bisbee and Conant had
reputations for successfully enforcing federal laws against Democratic intimidators of Negro voters. Republican leaders declared
that they must be retained if Negro Republicans were to have the
chance to vote in the 1872 election. The two were quickly restored, and most Republicans continued to complain that Reed
was indifferent, and some accused him of supporting the
Democrats.
The Democratic ticket headed by Bloxham was soundly defeated. Negro voters had come to the polls in larger numbers than
the Democrats expected, and the Republican factional division
had caused less damage than was anticipated. The Democratic
ticket and campaign had left dissatisfied Republicans little choice
but to support their party. Furthermore, many native white Floridians did not even register or vote. 42 Unable to muster a majority at the polls, Democratic leaders resolved to improve their efforts at exploiting the Republican factional situation.
40. W. J. Purman to Chandler, August 22, 1872, and A. A. Knight to
Chandler, September 15, 1872, ibid.
41. J. O. Townsend to George H. Williams, October 7, 1872, Chandler
to Ulysses S. Grant, September 24, 1872, Justice Dept. Records,
Record Group 60; A. A. Knight to Chandler, October 6, 1872,
Osborn to Chandler, October 18, 1872, Josiah T. Walls to Chandler,
October 16, 1872, Chandler Papers; Horatio Bisbee to Henry S. Sanford, October 9, 1872, Sanford Papers, Sanford Memorial Library,
Sanford, Florida.
42. Bronson Weekly Artery, October 24, 1874, quoting the Tallahassee
Floridian; Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, May 9, 1876; Jacksonville
Tri-Weekly Sun, April 25, 1876; Savannah Morning News, July 8,
1876; Quitman [Ga.] Independent, January 23, 1876.
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Because the organization was almost fragmented at times, it is
difficult to generalize, but it is still possible to identify broad divisions in the Republican party. Governor Hart died in 1874, and
was succeeded by Lieutenant Governor Stearns, an able politician who had built up strong support. His most dependable allies
were county leaders and most federal officials. The officials had
been appointed by Osborn but owed no allegience to his replacement, Simon B. Conover, former state treasurer and state senator.
Conover was supported by some of the Negro leaders and the few
Radicals who remained in Florida. He also managed to keep good
relations with the Democrats who were associated with Charles
Dyke of the Tallahassee Floridian.
Old-line Republicans recently arrived in East Florida made
up a segment of the party that became increasingly important.
They were interested primarily in orderly, economical state government under which they could settle land and establish their
business enterprises. They were also influenced by independent
Florida Republicans like J. S. Adams, former Commissioner of
Immigration and editor of the Jacksonville New South, and Solon
Robinson, one-time agricultural editor of the New York Tribune
and now associated with the Jacksonville Weekly Republican and
the Florida Agriculturist. Both men published materials for farmers and citrus growers and at the same time recommended independent political action. Robinson advised his readers to vote the
national Republican ticket and the Democratic state ticket because
of the corruption in the Florida Republican party.
The growth of Democratic strength was demonstrated by the
senatorial elections of 1873 and 1875. The 1873 legislature was
composed of thirteen Republican and eleven Democratic senators,
with twenty-nine Republicans and twenty-three Democrats in the
house. Its first important duty was to elect a successor to Thomas
W. Osborn. There were several hopefuls in both parties, and the
election required twenty-two ballots. During early balloting,
Republicans scattered their support while the Democrats mustered all their strength behind leading Democrats, especially William Bloxham. But when it became clear that they could not elect
their choice, the Democrats settled on Republican Simon B. Conover as an acceptable alternative. The last ballots were between
Conover and Democratic Supreme Court Justice James D. Westcott, whose most consistent support came from a group of Repub-
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licans. Conover was elected with forty-three votes to twenty-one
for his opponent. More Democrats voted for Conover than Westcott, but Democrats explained that this was because they wished
to keep the judge on the state court where he had been beneficial
to the party. 43
The Democratic Floridian praised the legislature for electing
Conover. Independent Republicans, opposed to Osborn, added
their approval because Conover was sympathetic with “those who
labored to redeem the State from the iron hand of an irresponsible
and tyrannical ring.” 44 Unable to elect one of their own, the
Democrats had thrown their strength behind the Republican who
seemed least objectionable.
By 1874 economic depression had replaced Reconstruction as
a major national issue, and it was becoming more difficult to find
common ground on which Negroes and their friends might stand
with Republicans who were more interested in the material benefits of party hegemony. After unruly nominating conventions,
highlighted by a furniture-destroying brawl in Tallahassee, Florida Republicans waged a campaign which gave them both congressional seats but little party harmony. In the state legislature
the senate was tied with twelve members of each party, while the
Democrats had a twenty-eight to twenty-five majority in the house.
With a small majority on joint ballot it appeared that the
Democrats could easily elect their choice to the senate seat to be
filled in 1875. Four Democrats who considered themselves independents thwarted party plans. Led by William Watkins Hicks
of Dade County, the independents cast their early votes for Samuel B. McLin, a Republican official and editor of the Tallahassee
Sentinel. After a long deadlock during which the regular Democrats consistently voted for one prominent Democrat after another, Hicks nominated Charles W. Jones, a relatively obscure
Democratic state senator from Escambia County, who was elected
on the twenty-fourth ballot. Both Democrats and independent
Republicans applauded the choice. The Jacksonville New South
cautioned Governor Stearns against trying to fix the blame for
43.

Florida Senate Journal (1873), 97; Tallahassee Weekly Floridian,
February 4, 18, 1873.
44. Jacksonville Florida Rebulican, February 5, 1873; John R. R. Polk
to Thomas F. Bayard, April 2, 1873, Thomas F. Bayard Papers,
Library of Congress.
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Republican defeat, since “the real cause was the years of disgraceful squabbling within the party.” 45
Democratic legislative influence was also apparent during this
period. In 1873 a civil rights bill provided equal treatment in
public accommodations but specifically authorized continued
school segregation. An 1874 law granted a five-year tax exemption on property of persons or corporations engaged in manufacturing. Constitutional amendments were submitted to the people
in 1875, providing for abolition of county courts and substituting
expensive annual legislative sessions with bienniel meetings. The
legislature in 1875 awarded the state printing contract, one of the
most lucrative of all patronage jobs, to staunch Democrat C. E.
Dyke. 46
Certification by a county returning board did not always mean
that an official had actually won the election. Every legislative
election was challenged. Probably the most famous case involved
E. T. Sturtevant, Republican incumbent senator from the twentyfirst district, and Israel M. Stewart. Although the senate was tied
in 1875, the Democrats controlled its organization, and they appointed a committee to investigate the contested election. It reported that Sturtevant, acting as an election official, had thrown
out Democratic votes in Dade County, and the returning board
had refused to count the Brevard County return, which was
Democratic, on the grounds that it arrived too late. A struggle
followed the committee’s recommendation to oust Sturtevant.
When Republicans sought to delay action by refusing to enter the
senate chamber, the sergeant-at-arms forced them in, but only
after a gun battle with two senators. Every member supported his
party and a deadlock resulted. Despite tremendous excitement
over the matter, Sturtevant was still in the senate when the 1875
legislature adjourned. 47
Francis M. Weeks contested the seat filled by Elisha G. Johnson from the fourteenth district on grounds that Johnson had
45.
46.
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committed fraud at a Columbia County precinct. No action was
taken against Johnson, a controversial Republican leader who had
received numerous threats on his life. Then, on July 21, 1875,
he was killed near his home by a shotgun fired by an unidentified
person. Democratic newspapers deplored the murder but noted
that Johnson was in office as the result of his own fraud. His
removal gave the Democrats a majority in the senate. Privately,
Henry A. L’Engle exulted, “In his death is our gain, . . . That
gives us a clear majority without putting out Sturtevant. . . . In
losing Johnson we gain a county. . . . If I was on a jury of
inquest I should say shot by persons unknown and served him
right. . . .” 48
The reason for his assassination was never established, but
Republicans used the incident to label the Democrats as the party
of murder and violence. Harney Richards of Alachua County was
arrested on scanty evidence for the midnight murder. After a long
controversy and widespread publicity, the grand jury released
Richards who had “proved an alibi by some of the very best citizens of the state.” 49 He was released after the 1876 election
campaign had gotten underway, and the case became another of
the election issues.
In 1876 the citadel of Republicanism was the governorship,
and bitter intra-party battles threatened their hold on that office.
Governor Stearns, Senator Conover, and other Republicans hurled
charges at each other which furnished the Democrats with campaign material. Congressman William J. Purman and Leon
County Senator John Wallace, an influential Negro, accused
Stearns of dishonesty, while others denounced Conover for embezzlement and Democratic collusion. Although arrested, Conover
was exonerated of embezzlement charges. At a convention in Madison, Stearns was renominated for governor. Many delegates refused
to accept the result and held their own convention to nominate
Conover. Despondent Republicans pleaded with Conover to withdraw from the race. “Florida Republicans must ‘Unite or Die!’ ”
the Tallahassee Sentinel prophesied. A disgusted Jacksonville
48. Henry A. L’Engle to Edward M. L’Engle, July 23, 1875, L’Engle
Papers; Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, August 3, 1875, quoting Tallahassee Sentinel; ibid., August 10, 1875, quoting Fernandina Observer; ibid., September 7, 1875, quoting Key West Dispatch.
49. Thomasville [Ga.] Times, November 6, 1875; Palatka Eastern Herald,
September 25, 1875.
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Republican announced that he and his friends would vote the
Florida Democratic ticket while supporting the Republican presidential nominee. The Jacksonville Florida Agriculturist also endorsed this policy. General Henry Sanford, a conservative Republican and large Central Florida grove man and land developer,
financed a Florida campaign for Republican candidate Rutherford
B. Hayes, but did not support the state ticket. Conover withdrew
in September but did not actively support Stearns. 50
The Democrats launched a “reform” campaign, calling on all
parties to support good government and get rid of the corrupt
Republicans. Bloxham and other native Democrats were passed
over, and George F. Drew was nominated for governor. The
Democrats intended to give dissatisfied Republicans every incentive to split their ticket in 1876. Drew later became known as
the man who “redeemed” Florida from the Republicans, yet he
was one of those New South leaders who was far more concerned
with economic development than reactionary politics and preservation of a social system. Originally from New Hampshire, he
had lived many years in Georgia and Florida. He had been a
Unionist during the Civil War, but Southerners could overlook
this since he had sold essential supplies to the Confederacy. He
had voted for Grant in 1868 and Greeley four years later. In
1876 he was a successful lumberman with a large mill at Ellaville
in Madison County. The Sentinel, incensed at his nomination,
said, “He must have been nominated to give the ‘Lost Cause’ a
Union flavor. . . . His nomination is a wicked fraud to catch
Union men and Northern Republicans coming into the state. We
would rather have the most bitter Bourbon. . . .” Democrat Edwin
W. L’Engle thought Drew’s chances of election were good but
that he would not be much better than a “Radical.” Columbia
County Democrats endorsed Drew even though he was “recently
of the Radical party.” The Republican Jacksonville Sun was willing to support Drew if he were free of the “Bourbons.” 51
50. Tallahassee Sentinel, July 15, 1876; John F. Rollins to Chandler,
A u g u s t 9 , 1 8 7 6 , C h a n d l e r P a p e r s ; Tallahassee Weekly Floridian,
October 10, 1876; Sanford to John Friend, December 31, 1877,
Sanford Papers.
51. Quitman, [Ga.] Reporter, June 8, 1876; Tallahassee Sentinel, June
10, 24, 1876; Edwin W. L’Engle to Edward M. L’Engle, May 19,
1876, L'Engle Papers; Savannah Morning News, May 28, 1876;
Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, August 22, 1876, quoting Jacksonville
Sun.
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In an exciting campaign Democrats called on voters to bring
about much needed reforms at the national and state levels, while
Republicans declared that victory was essential to prevent the
undoing of all that had been accomplished since the war. Both
tried to reach every potential voter and see that he was registered
and willing to go to the polls. Tempers flared but there was relatively little violence. There was fraud and intimidation, but it was
kept to a minimum by constant patrolling at key points by both
parties. Because Florida was one of the three southern states upon
whose electoral votes the presidential election depended, every
scrap of evidence hinting at irregularity was gathered and aired
in the national press.
Early returns in the November election indicated that the outcome would depend on a few votes. National political dignitaries
rushed to Florida to obtain a favorable decision from the official
canvassing board. The state board, responsible for compiling the
county returns and certifying the victorious candidates, was composed of two Republicans and one Democrat. Subjected to pressure from both sides, these men ultimately decided the outcome
strictly according to party affiliations. The Republican majority
threw out enough Democratic votes to elect the Republican presidential electors and the Republican state ticket as well. With less
than 100 votes separating the presidential tickets, there were
enough questionable returns so that the board could probably have
declared for the Republicans without anyone challenging its decision. Rut the Republican state ticket was running several hundred
votes behind and the Republicans on the canvassing board
desperately wanted a state victory. In throwing out enough votes
to accomplish this, their flagrant action opened the way for court
intervention.
Drew obtained a court order directing the board to count
returns exactly as received from the counties, a procedure which
would result in a Democratic victory. The board ignored the court
order and declared Stearns the victor. A long count battle followed,
during which the Republican canvassing board members were
threatened with contempt citations. The Florida Supreme Court,
with one Democrat and two Republican members, unanimously
issued a writ of mandamus requiring the board to count all county
returns as received. This gave Drew the governorship although
the recount did not pertain to presidential electors. After a lengthy
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dispute before the electoral commission in February, Florida’s four
electoral votes were counted for Hayes and helped make him
president. Long before that, on January 2, 1877, Drew had been
peacefully inaugurated as Florida’s governor. 52
Stearns and the Florida Republicans who lost offices as a result
of the recount were disappointed but refused to pursue the matter
further in court because of the damage it might do to the national
ticket. 53 Many Negroes regarded Stearns’ defeat as a repudiation
of the Radical program, although much of that Radical program
had failed as early as the 1868 constitutional convention. At the
same time, many members of both parties were satisfied with
Drew’s election. Wilkinson Call complained that some Florida
Democrats felt a Republican president was acceptable as long as
they had a Democratic governor. Consequently the Democrats
had not demanded an electoral vote recount under the court order
which had benefited Drew. Northerners were amazed at the
speed with which Florida Democrats dropped Tilden in exchange
for the governorship. 54
Frank Sherwin, Stearns’ secretary and an associate of Republican officials of the Southern Inland Navigation and Improvement Company, predicted Drew’s administration would be satisfactory: “My friends and business associates control Drew to a
great extent. . . . I have a very positive influence and I believe
it possible to have this incoming State administration thoroughly
in accord with the Hayes government. . . . Three of the cabinet
just confirmed and are excellent selections. . . . The Bourbon element is nowhere.” 55 The Jacksonville Florida Union, which often
represented the views of East Florida business interests, approved
52. Rome, [Ga.] Courier, December 13, 1876; C. Gibson to Samuel J.
Tilden, December 9, 1876, Samuel J. Tilden Papers, Box 13, New
York Public Library; 16 Florida Reports 19-29, 52-63 (1876); New
York Times, December 24, 1876; R. B. Hilton to Manton Marble,
December 23, 1876, Manton Marble Papers, Library of Congress;
A. A. Sargent to O. P. Morton, December 22, 1876, M. L. Stearns
to Chandler, December 22, 1876, S. B. McLin to Chandler, December 24, 1876, Chandler Papers.
53. D. Montgomery to Chandler, March 25, 1877, Stearns to Osborn,
February 21, 1877, Chandler Papers.
54. Wilkinson Call to Marble, January 5, 7, 1877, R. B. Hilton to
Marble, December 27, 31, 1876, January 4, 7, 1877, Tilden Papers,
Box 13; Thomas Donaldson to Rutherford B. Hayes, December 18,
1876, Rutherford B. Hayes Papers, Hayes Memorial Library, Fremont, Ohio. Microfilm copies of Hayes Papers in Library of Congress.
55. F. B. Sherwin to Chandler, January 3, 1877, Chandler Papers.
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Drew’s cabinet appointments and praised the new governor for
exhibiting a “liberal Republican disposition.” “If we have got to
have a Democratic State government we rejoice that there is so
little of the old Democracy in it,” the Union remarked. 56
Whatever new departures may have resulted at the national
level from the disputed election and compromise of 1877, in Florida the election was just one more step toward Democratic supremacy. It is indicative of the political struggle during this period
that Florida’s “redeeming” Democratic governor was from New
Hampshire, while the state’s first native born governor, Ossian B.
Hart, was a Republican. By 1880 the Democrats would have
enough strength to win with Bloxham, but in 1876 they wanted
a man who would attract the Northerners who felt that they
could not support an ex-Confederate.
There seems to be little justification for the old assertion that
white Floridians were helpless under a corrupt government staffed with outsiders and supported by ignorant Negro voters until
a determined native movement threw the intruders out in the
1876 election. It seems that Democrats bargained with more or
less success for concessions at every possible point during the period
and arrived at the 1876 election in a position of strength nearly
equal to their Republican foes. Although the Florida Democrats
sometimes used methods which are not acceptable for a loyal opposition in a two-party arrangement, Florida came nearer to having an operating two-party system in 1876 than it has had since.
The Reconstruction era was a period in which economic,
political, and social institutions, devastated by the war and its
consequences, had to be repaired or replaced. The Radicals emphasized replacement while native Democrats wished to apply
minor repairs. Moderate Republicans steered a middle path and
gained control of the new government. Because of internal differences and the magnitude of their undertaking, this group was
unable to execute an effective program. They must bear the responsibility for the chaos and inefficiency which has marred this
period of Florida history, but with the state in a phase of great
change and rebuilding, any government would have had difficulty.
The Democrats must share the responsibility. Whether they were
destroying Republican control in the northern counties by terror
56. Jacksonville Florida Union, January 5, 1877.
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and murder, resisting unfavorable legislation by dilatory tactics,
or helping to formulate a positive program in alliance with moderate Republicans, they were a limiting factor on Republican policy
makers.
Shouting “the bottom rail is on top,” Florida Negroes hailed
the Radicals who first controlled the constitutional convention,
but these men did not survive their first major struggle. They
influenced Florida Reconstruction only to the extent that they
could muster opposition to moderate Republican policy and therefore increase disorder. While they may have obstructed a cohesive
program, these men did not have a major voice in the government.
No propertyless class legislated against a helpless, propertied class
in Florida. The Negroes were always a minority in government
offices. Some served in the state senate and house, and others
were county officials, but only Jonathan C. Gibbs as secretary of
state and superintendent of public instruction, and Josiah T.
Walls, as congressman, attained high office. Both Gibbs and
Walls were qualified for their offices. While the “bottom rail”
may have been temporarily lifted a notch or two during Reconstruction, no Negro-controlled party dominated Florida. The
Democrats of the 1890s who called for white solidarity to prevent
a return to the terrible days of Reconstruction were distorting the
history of Reconstruction in Florida.
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